quarta-feira, 16 de março de 2011

O direitista Piñera:um ano de retrocesso no Chile

El primer año de gobierno de Sebastián Piñera: entre el desconcierto y la emergencia

*María de los Ángeles Fernández


El triunfo de la derecha en la quinta elección presidencial en Chile después del retorno a la democracia en 1990 no dejó de ser una sorpresa, especialmente por su controvertido rol en el quiebre de la democracia en Chile en 1973.
La forma en que asumió el poder, en medio de las réplicas del megasismo que asoló al país el 27 de febrero de 2010, ofrece un contexto marcado por la emergencia. Basta señalar que 48% de los proyectos aprobados correspondió a iniciativas vinculadas a la reconstrucción. A ello se sumó el exitoso rescate de 33 mineros. El hecho, que develó las deplorables condiciones laborales en las minas, le permitió a Sebastián Piñera hablar de la “chilean way”, entendida como una forma de hacer las cosas bien y con sentido de urgencia.
El 11 de marzo se cumple un año de su instalación, lo que da la oportunidad para un primer balance de su gestión. ¿En función de qué criterios? El más inmediato es la revisión de sus promesas de campaña. El actual presidente prometió que haría lo mismo que sus antecesores, aunque mejor, bajo la consigna de “la nueva forma de gobernar”. Sus prioridades fueron crecimiento económico, más empleo y combate a la delincuencia. Bajo esos parámetros debería tener una buena nota: Chile recuperó la senda del crecimiento, el nivel de empleo ha crecido y los índices de temor y de victimización muestran un descenso.
Pero las encuestas dicen otra cosa. Rompiendo una tendencia habitual en el país, su popularidad ha estado por debajo de la de su equipo, salvo por el momento estelar que supuso el rescate minero. Algo también inusual es que, por momentos, la desaprobación es mayor que la aprobación. Una primera explicación alude a su déficit en aquellos atributos que Michelle Bachelet introdujo en la política chilena: honestidad, cr edibilidad y cercanía. Otros esgrimen que no separó sus negocios de la política con la celeridad esperada. Una tercera señalaría que el contraste entre buenos indicadores objetivos y la evaluación subjetiva crítica pasa porque, si bien se crearon nuevos empleos (la mayoría en la categoría “por cuenta propia”), estos están lejos de ser buenos empleos.
Pero lo que más debate viene generando es su estilo de liderazgo. En un país orgulloso de su solidez institucional, la prensa habla de “piñerismo” para reflejar su exacerbado personalismo. Sus propios partidos resintieron, desde el comienzo, el carácter tecnocrático de su gabinete y la poca consideración que merecen, especialmente la Unión Demócrata Independiente. Luego de la movilización de la región de Magallanes por el alza del precio del gas, Piñera realizó su primer cambio ministerial, integrando a dos senadores con experiencia política. Está por verse si ello solucionará las deb ilid ades políticas de un gobierno que, además de no lograr ordenar razonablemente sus propias filas, no cuenta con mayoría parlamentaria.
Algunas de sus decisiones han resultado desconcertantes como, por ejemplo, el alza de impuestos para financiar la reconstrucción. El intento por sumar temas ajenos a las preocupaciones de su sector como el medio ambiente o los derechos humanos y deslastrarse, de paso, de la derecha tradicional, ha llevado a acuñar la expresión Nueva Derecha, inspirada esencialmente en la forma en que David Cameron, en el Reino Unido, supo arrebatar al Laborismo emblemáticas banderas de lucha. Mientras tanto, las entrañas del gobierno se ven tensionadas entre liberales y conservadores, especialmente en los llamados temas valóricos. En el campo de la igualdad de género, visibilizado por Bachelet como un asunto de Estado, se ha retrocedido a una visión familista y conservadora. A ello se suma el intento por desmantelar la institucionalida d de g énero, creada en 1990 y reconocida internacionalmente.
En cuanto a la Concertación, devenida en una parte de la oposición, además de estar situada en el Congreso se ve desafiada a constituir la oposición social y cultural que no tiene. Desplegó un comportamiento errático, parcialmente entendible por el escaso margen que ofrece un régimen hiperpresidencial. Por otro lado, se ha visto internamente tensionada entre lógicas inerciales y demandas por configurar un nuevo referente que avance hacia una nueva mayoría social y política.
Ad portas de su segundo año, mientras el gobierno ha prometido que impulsará “siete reformas estructurales” a fin de acallar a quienes critican la insuficiencia de un relato meramente eficientista, se levantan dos tipos de voces: las que afirman que, por la continuidad, se asiste a un “quinto” gobierno de la Concertación y aquellas que advierten intenciones de refundación política y en la que los embates privati zadores constituirían, apenas, un aspecto más.

Publicado originalmente na revista Nueva Sociedade - março de 2011

quinta-feira, 10 de março de 2011

O papel subordinado dos serviços na criação de empregos

Mundo dos serviços
Marcio Pochmann


Na vigência das sociedades agrárias, a ocupação agrícola chegou a representar 4/5 do total dos postos de trabalho. Com a passagem para a sociedade urbano-industrial, a mão de obra no setor secundário das economias (construção civil e manufatura) que conseguiram se industrializar chegou a alcançar quase 2/5 do total da ocupação.

Atualmente, com a sequência da transição para a sociedade pós-industrial, as economias desenvolvidas já se aproximam da concentração de 85% do total dos postos de trabalho somente no setor terciário (serviços e comércio). Com isso, a agropecuária e manufatura terminam por responder apenas com menos de 1/6 do total da ocupação.

Na passagem do século XIX para o século XX, por exemplo, o esvaziamento relativo e absoluto dos postos de trabalho na agropecuária foi acompanhado simultaneamente pelo engrandecimento das vagas abertas com a maior dinâmica na economia urbana (setores secundário e terciário). Os Estados Unidos exemplificam bem esse movimento. No final do século XIX, o setor primário da economia (agropecuária e mineração) respondia por cerca de 35% do total dos postos de trabalho. Cem anos depois, somente 2,2% do total das ocupações encontram-se sob a responsabilidade do setor primário na economia estadunidense.

Em síntese, destaca-se que com apenas 2 milhões de trabalhadores no campo, os Estados Unidos conseguem manter uma das agriculturas mais avançadas e produtivas do mundo. Já a construção civil responde atualmente por 1/3 dos empregos do setor secundário, sendo a manufatura responsável pela absorção de menos de 14 milhões de trabalhadores.

No caso brasileiro, a trajetória tendeu a ser a mesma, porém distinta ao longo do tempo e na intensidade. Por força do atraso de sua industrialização, o Brasil conviveu até a década de 1950 com o setor primário sendo o principal absorvedor de mão de obra. Somente no ano de 1960 os postos de trabalho urbanos tornaram-se majoritários. Nos dias de hoje, o país possui, comparativamente aos Estados Unidos, quase dez vezes mais ocupados em relação ao total dos empregos no setor primário, não obstante a pujança da agropecuária nacional.

Também no setor secundário residem diferenças significativas. De um lado, o Brasil não conseguiu apresentar a mesma importância relativa da manufatura e da construção civil no total da ocupação verificada nos Estados Unidos. A melhor posição ocorreu ao final da década de 1970, com 1/4 de todos os postos de trabalhos situados no setor secundário, ao contrário dos Estados Unidos, que na década de 1920 estiveram próximos de registrar 1/3 da ocupação associada à construção civil e manufatura.

O trabalho imaterial resulta heterogêneo e varia da alta remuneração até a extrema precarização

A partir de 1980, o Brasil passou a perseguir rapidamente o movimento equivalente ao verificado lentamente nos Estados Unidos desde a década de 1920. Ou seja, perda de importância relativa do setor secundário no total da ocupação.

A tendência de expansão dos empregos no setor terciário parece ser comum nos dois países em consideração. Atualmente, os Estados Unidos possuem 5/6 dos empregos nos serviços e comércio, enquanto no Brasil são um pouco mais de 2/3 das ocupações no setor terciário.

Em virtude disso, convém atentar para o fato que o setor terciário da economia não detém dinâmica própria na propulsão quantitativa e qualitativa de suas ocupações. O segmento produtivo (primário e secundário) exerce influência decisiva sobre a quantidade e qualidade dos postos de trabalho no terciário. Isso porque o mundo dos serviços (trabalho imaterial) resulta heterogêneo, comportando tanto postos de trabalho de grande qualidade, com remuneração associada à elevação da qualificação profissional, como os de extrema precarização (baixo rendimento independentemente da qualidade da mão de obra existente).

Os exemplos podem ser obtidos na estrutura ocupacional dos Estados Unidos e do Brasil. Se for ocupação gerada nos setores de serviços de produção e sociais, por exemplo, a remuneração tende a refletir a qualificação da força de trabalho, diferentemente dos empregos nos serviços pessoais e de distribuição, que geralmente não conectam a qualificação profissional com o predomínio da desvalorização do trabalho.

A determinação do mundo dos serviços depende, em síntese, da qualidade e importância da manufatura no interior do sistema econômico. Sem isso, os serviços tendem a expandir muitas vezes sustentados pelo trabalho precário, aprofundando a separação entre ocupações nobres e pobres e demarcando uma estrutura social ainda mais iníqua.

Marcio Pochmann é presidente do Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea), professor licenciado do Instituto de Economia e do Centro de Estudos Sindicais e de Economia do Trabalho (Cesit) da Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Unicamp).
Publicado originalmente no jornal Valor Econômico, em 10/03/2011

quarta-feira, 9 de março de 2011

Teorias sociais

ANTONIO DELFIM NETTO

Teorias sociais

Todo analista de problemas sociais comprometido com uma "teoria" e, portanto, engajado, impõe-se uma sorte de miopia. Seja o caso: a) de um "neoclássico" que crê no equilíbrio geral do sistema econômico para dar um "ar científico" às suas recomendações; b) de um "marxista" que crê no materialismo histórico para dar um "ar de ciência" de como ver o mundo e sugerir sua mudança, ou c) de um "keynesiano" que se concentra na demanda global, na irremediável incerteza sobre o futuro, em conceitos psicológicos duvidosos e tem a teoria geral como o limite intransponível à compreensão da economia.
Em ciências humanas, as "teorias" são produto do tempo e do espaço: dos interesses políticos, econômicos e sociais (no fundo, de como a sociedade se organiza), da sua história e das circunstâncias impostas por seu território.
Elas e, portanto, suas recomendações variam no tempo e no espaço conforme interesses da classe que detém o poder e pode produzir a "política econômica" que lhe convém.
Há, consequentemente, sérias dúvidas sobre a famosa alegação de Keynes de que "as concepções de economistas e filósofos políticos, corretas ou erradas, são mais poderosas do que geralmente se suspeita... e que homens práticos, que se creem infensos a qualquer influência intelectual são, frequentemente, escravos do pensamento de algum economista que já morreu".
Sua própria teoria foi produto do seu tempo e do seu espaço.
Como lembrou o professor Von Mering (1944), o brilhante mas discutível Pareto ("Mind and Society") mostrou que os interesses (que chamamos de A), a política econômica (B) e a teoria (C) podem ter outra ordem: os interesses da classe que tem o poder político (A) constroem a política econômica que os satisfaz (B) e a teoria (C) racionaliza tal processo.
O exemplo de Pareto é muito interessante: poderosos interesses individuais (A) de quem estava assumindo o poder político (a burguesia emergente na Inglaterra) determinaram a política do "free trade" (B). A teoria (C) só veio depois, mas não teve importância na sua efetivação. Só racionalizou-a e aumentou a resistência à volta da proteção.
Ele fez uma previsão: se e quando (A) mudasse (aumentasse o poder político dos trabalhadores), a política protecionista poderia voltar e a teoria (C) iria se ajustar, como aliás, foi o caso de Keynes.
Substitua (A) por interesses da classe financeira que assumiu lentamente o controle político nos Estados Unidos depois de 1980; (B) pela desregulação das atividades produzida por esse controle e verá como nasceu a teoria (C) dos mercados perfeitos para dar-lhe racionalidade...

Publicado originalmente no jornal Folha de S. Paulo, em 09/03/2011

sexta-feira, 4 de março de 2011

Pelo "destravecamento" da fêmea, de Xico Sá

Festa perdeu a beleza da gostosa normal

Xico Sá


É CARNAVAL, mas a festa da carne, de onde vem o sacroprofano nome, virou a orgia dos corpos artificiais. Deram um truque na lição de anatomia clássica.
Não se trata de uma queixa moralista, como fizemos, de modo conservador, quando surgiram as primeiras criaturas siliconadas da nova era.
Cada um esculpe a massa corporal à modinha do seu espelho narcisista, não é mesmo? Assim ficamos democraticamente combinados.
O que pega é outro ponto. Como faz falta, durante a farra erótica, aquela imagem das carnes femininas balançando diante das câmeras! A carne das gostosas normais.
Os novos corpos, por mais que as cabrochas sejam exímias dançarinas, não seguem o ritmo do samba. É tudo muito duro, como nos travestis.
Seja o recurso naturalíssimo do músculo trabalhado obsessivamente nas academias de ginástica ou a manjada beleza industrial do silicone, o Carnaval fica nos devendo a fartura da carne mais feminina e, se possível, trêmula.
Roberto Carlos, homenageado neste ano com o samba enredo da escola Beija-Flor, também faz coro a esta nossa queixa. Fã de uma moça renascentista, ele defende, com outras palavras, a nossa causa.
"Gosto de me encostar/ Nesse seu decote quando te abraço/ De ter onde pegar/ Nessa maciez enquanto te amasso", canta o Rei no tributo às moças que fogem ao padrão em voga.
Outro mestre na arte de observar as mulheres, o ilustrador José Luiz Benício, autor dos melhores cartazes da pornochanchada brasileira, entra também nesse coro.
"O que acontece é que hoje em dia as mulheres estão masculinizadas. Elas estão ficando fortes, perdendo aquelas curvas", disse Benício em entrevista ao portal UOL. "Um processo que, a meu ver, está ligado à competição com os homens em todas as áreas."
Mais gostosura dentro da suposta normalidade e menos alta definição plástica. Que ressurja a mulher de carne macia, a mulher-comfort. Enfim, pelo "destravecamento" da fêmea. Assim no Carnaval como no expediente normal da vida.

Publicado originalmente no jornal Folha de S. Paulo, em 04/03/2011

quinta-feira, 3 de março de 2011

Porque se fazem guerras na atualidade em ingl

De:Global Research E-Newsletter

For Money, For Oil? Why Wars Really Happen

By David Swanson


Global Research, March 1, 2011

Many discussions of lies that launch wars quickly come around to the question "Well then why did they want the war?" There is usually more than one single motive involved, but the motives are not terribly hard to find.

Unlike many soldiers who have been lied to, most of the key war deciders, the masters of war who determine whether or not wars happen, do not in any sense have noble motives for what they do. Though noble motives can be found in the reasoning of some of those involved, even in some of those at the highest levels of decision making, it is very doubtful that such noble intentions alone would ever generate wars.

Economic and imperial motives have been offered by presidents and congress members for most of our major wars, but they have not been endlessly hyped and dramatized as have other alleged motivations. War with Japan was largely about the economic value of Asia, but fending off the evil Japanese emperor made a better poster. The Project for the New American Century, a think tank pushing for war on Iraq, made its motives clear a dozen years before it got its war — motives that included U.S. military dominance of the globe with more and larger bases in key regions of "American interest." That goal was not repeated as often or as shrilly as "WMD," "terrorism," "evildoer," or "spreading democracy."

The most important motivations for wars are the least talked about, and the least important or completely fraudulent motivations are the most discussed. The important motivations, the things the war masters mostly discuss in private, include electoral calculations, control of natural resources, intimidation of other countries, domination of geographic regions, financial profits for friends and campaign funders, the opening up of consumer markets, and prospects for testing new weapons.

If politicians were honest, electoral calculations would deserve to be openly discussed and would constitute no ground for shame or secrecy. Elected officials ought to do what will get them reelected, within the structure of laws that have been democratically established. But our conception of democracy has become so twisted that reelection as a motivation for action is hidden away alongside profiteering. This is true for all areas of government work; the election process is so corrupt that the public is viewed as yet another corrupting influence. When it comes to war, this sense is heightened by politicians' awareness that wars are marketed with lies.

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) was a think tank from 1997 to 2006 in Washington, D.C. (later revived in 2009). Seventeen members of PNAC served in high positions in the George W. Bush administration, including Vice President, Chief of Staff to the Vice President, Special Assistant to the President, Deputy Secretary of "Defense," ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq, Deputy Secretary of State, and Under Secretary of State.

One individual who was part of PNAC and later of the Bush Administration, Richard Perle, together with another Bush bureaucrat-to-be Douglas Feith, had worked for Israeli Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 and produced a paper called A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm. The realm was Israel, and the strategy advocated was hyper-militarized nationalism and the violent removal of regional foreign leaders including Saddam Hussein.

In 1998, PNAC published an open letter to President Bill Clinton urging him to adopt the goal of regime change for Iraq, which he did. That letter included this:

"[I]f Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world's supply of oil will all be put at hazard."

In 2000, PNAC published a paper titled Rebuilding America's Defenses. The goals set forth in this paper fit much more coherently with the actual behavior of the masters of war than do any notions of "spreading democracy" or "standing up to tyranny." When Iraq attacks Iran we help out. When it attacks Kuwait we step in. When it does nothing we bomb it. This behavior makes no sense in terms of the fictional stories we're told, but makes perfect sense in terms of these goals from PNAC:

• maintaining U.S. preeminence,

• precluding the rise of a great power rival, and

• shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests.

PNAC determined that we would need to "fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars" and "perform the 'constabulary' duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions." In the same 2000 paper, PNAC wrote:

"While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein. The placement of U.S. bases has yet to reflect these realities....From an American perspective, the value of such bases would endure even should Saddam pass from the scene. Over the long term, Iran may well prove as large a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf as Iraq has. And even should U.S.-Iranian relations improve, retaining forward- based forces in the region would still be an essential element in U.S. security strategy. . . ."

These papers were published and widely available years before the invasion of Iraq, and yet to suggest that U.S. forces would try to stay and build permanent bases in Iraq even after killing Saddam Hussein was scandalous in the halls of Congress or the corporate media. To suggest that the War on Iraq had anything to do with our imperial bases or oil or Israel, much less that Hussein did not as yet have weapons, was heretical. Even worse was to suggest that those bases might be used to launch attacks on other countries, in line with PNAC's goal of "maintaining U.S. preeminence." And yet Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO from 1997 to 2000 Wesley Clark claims that in 2001, Secretary of War Donald Rumsfeld put out a memo proposing to take over seven countries in five years: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran.

The basic outline of this plan was confirmed by none other than former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who in 2010 pinned it on former Vice President Dick Cheney:

"Cheney wanted forcible 'regime change' in all Middle Eastern countries that he considered hostile to U.S. interests, according to Blair. 'He would have worked through the whole lot, Iraq, Syria, Iran, dealing with all their surrogates in the course of it — Hezbollah, Hamas, etc.,' Blair wrote. 'In other words, he [Cheney] thought the world had to be made anew, and that after 11 September, it had to be done by force and with urgency. So he was for hard, hard power. No ifs, no buts, no maybes.'"

Crazy? Sure! But that's what succeeds in Washington. As each of those invasions happened, new excuses would have been made public for each. But the underlying reasons would have remained those quoted above.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES

Part of the ethos of "toughness" required of U.S. war makers has been a habit of thought that detects a major, global, and demonic enemy behind every shadow. For decades the enemy was the Soviet Union and the threat of global communism. But the Soviet Union never had the global military presence of the United States or the same interest in empire building. Its weapons and threats and aggressions were constantly exaggerated, and its presence was detected anytime a small, poor nation put up resistance to U.S. dominance. Koreans and Vietnamese, Africans and South Americans couldn't possibly have their own sovereign interests, it was assumed. If they were refusing our unsolicited guidance, somebody had to be putting them up to it.

A commission created by President Reagan called the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy proposed more small wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Concerns included "U.S. access to critical regions," "American credibility among allies and friends," "American self-confidence," and "America's ability to defend its interests in the most vital regions, such as the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, and the Western Pacific."

But what should the public be told we and our interests were being defended against? Why, an evil empire, of course! During the so-called Cold War, the communist conspiracy justification was so common that some very intelligent people believed U.S. war making couldn't go on without it. Here's Richard Barnet:

"The myth of monolithic Communism — that all activities of people everywhere who call themselves Communists or whom J. Edgar Hoover calls Communists are planned and controlled in the Kremlin — is essential to the ideology of the national security bureaucracy. Without it the President and his advisers would have a harder time identifying the enemy. They certainly could not find opponents worthy of the 'defense' efforts of the mightiest military power in the history of the world."

Ha! My apologies if you had any drink in your mouth and sprayed it on your clothing as you read that. As if the wars will not go on! As if the wars were not the reason for the communist threat, rather than the other way around! Writing in 1992, John Quigley could see this clearly:

"[T]he political reform that swept eastern Europe in 1989-90 left the cold war on the ash heap of history. Even so, our military interventions did not end. In 1989, we intervened to support a government in the Philippines and to overthrow one in Panama. In 1990, we sent a massive force to the Persian Gulf.

"The continuation of military interventions is not, however, surprising, because the aim all along... has been less to fight communism than to maintain our own control."

The threat of the Soviet Union or communism was, within a dozen years replaced with the threat of al Qaeda or terrorism. Wars against an empire and an ideology would become wars against a small terrorist group and a tactic. The change had some advantages. While the Soviet Union could publicly collapse, a secretive and widely dispersed collection of terrorist cells to which we could apply the name al Qaeda could never be proven to have gone away. An ideology could fall out of favor, but anywhere we fought wars or imposed unwelcome control, people would fight back, and their fighting would be "terrorism" because it was directed against us. This was a new justification for never-ending war. But the motivation was the war, not the crusade to eliminate terrorism which crusade would, of course, produce more terrorism.

The motivation was U.S. control over areas of "vital interest," namely profitable natural resources and markets and strategic positions for military bases from which to extend power over yet more resources and markets, and from which to deny any imaginable "rivals" anything resembling "American self-confidence." This is, of course, aided and abetted by the motivations of those who profit financially from the war making itself.

FOR MONEY AND MARKETS

Economic motivations for wars are not exactly news. The most famous lines from Smedley Butler's War Is A Racket are not actually in that book at all, but in a 1935 issue of the Socialist newspaper Common Sense, where he wrote:

"I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went on its way unmolested. Looking back on it, I might have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three districts. I operated on three continents."

This explanation of motives for wars was not usually presented in Butler's colorful language, but it wasn't secret either. In fact, war propagandists have long argued for portraying wars as beneficial to big business whether or not they actually would be:

"For the sake of the business men the war must appear as a profitable enterprise. L.G. Chiozza, Money, M.P., published a statement in the London Daily Chronicle for August 10th, 1914, which is a pattern for this sort of thing. He wrote:

"'Our chief competitor both in Europe and outside it will be unable to trade, and at the conclusion of the War the unmistakable antagonism which German aggression is everywhere arousing will help us to keep the trade and shipping we will win from her.'"

To Carl von Clausewitz, who died in 1831, war was "a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means." That sounds about right, as long as we understand that war makers often have a preference for the means of war even when other means might achieve the same results. In an August 31st, 2010, Oval Office speech praising the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Obama exclaimed: "New markets for our goods stretch from Asia to the Americas!" In 1963, John Quigley, not yet an analyst of war lies, was a Marine assigned to lecture his unit on world affairs. When one of his students objected to the idea of fighting in Vietnam, Quigley "explained patiently that there was oil underneath Vietnam's continental shelf, that Vietnam's large population was an important market for our products, and that Vietnam commanded the sea route from the Middle East to the Far East."

But let's start at the beginning. Before he became president, William McKinley said "We want a foreign market for our surplus products." As president, he told Governor Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin he wanted "to attain U.S. supremacy in world markets." When Cuba was in danger of achieving its independence from Spain without assistance, McKinley persuaded Congress not to recognize the revolutionary government. After all, his goal was not Cuban independence, or Puerto Rican or Filipino independence. When he took over the Philippines, McKinley thought he was advancing the goal of "supremacy in world markets." When the people of the Philippines fought back, he called it an "insurrection." He described the war as a humanitarian mission for the Filipinos' own good. McKinley pioneered by saying first what later presidents would say as a matter of routine when engaged in wars for resources or markets.

A month before the United States entered World War I, on March 5, 1917, the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines Page, sent a cable to President Woodrow Wilson, reading in part:

"The pressure of this approaching crisis, I am certain, has gone beyond the ability of the Morgan financial agency for the British and French governments. The financial necessities of the Allies are too great and urgent for any private agency to handle, for every such agency has to encounter business rivalries and sectional antagonism. It is not improbable that the only way of maintaining our present preeminent trade position and averting a panic is by declaring war on Germany."

When peace had been made with Germany ending World War I, President Wilson kept U.S. troops in Russia to fight the Soviets, despite earlier claims that our troops were in Russia in order to defeat Germany and intercept supplies bound for Germany. Senator Hiram Johnson (P., Calif.) had famously said of the launching of the war: "The first casualty when war comes, is truth." He now had something to say about the failure to end the war when the peace treaty had been signed. Johnson denounced the ongoing fighting in Russia and quoted from the Chicago Tribune when it claimed that the goal was to help Europe collect Russia's debt.

In 1935, considering the brewing financial interest in war with Japan, Norman Thomas pointed out that, at least from a national perspective, if not from the perspective of particular profiteers, it made no sense: "Our whole trade with Japan, China, and the Philippines in 1933 amounted to 525 million dollars or enough to have carried on the First World War for less than two and one-half days!"

Yes, he called it the "first" world war, because he saw what was coming. One year before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a State Department memo on Japanese expansionism said not a word about independence for China. But it did say:

". . . our general diplomatic and strategic position would be considerably weakened — by our loss of Chinese, Indian, and South Seas markets (and by our loss of much of the Japanese market for our goods, as Japan would become more and more self-sufficient) as well as by insurmountable restrictions upon our access to rubber, tin, jute, and other vital materials of the Asian and Oceanic regions."

During World War II, Secretary of State Cordell Hull chaired a "committee on political problems" which decided to handle perceived public fears that the United States would try to "feed, clothe, reconstruct, and police the world." The fears would be calmed by convincing the public that U.S. goals were to prevent another war and to provide "free access to raw materials and [foster] international commerce." The words of the Atlantic Charter ("equal access") became "free access," meaning access for the United States, but not necessarily for anybody else.

During the Cold War, the stated reasons for wars changed more than the real ones, as fighting communism gave cover for killing people to win markets, foreign labor, and resources. We said we were fighting for democracy, but we backed dictators like Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. The result was a bad name for the United States, and the empowering of leftist governments in reaction to our interference. Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho) concluded that we had "lost, or grievously impaired, the good name and reputation of the United States."

Even if war makers did not have economic motives, it would still be impossible for corporations not to see economic gains as fortuitous byproducts of wars. As George McGovern and William Polk noted in 2006: "In 2002, just before the American invasion [of Iraq], only one of the world's ten most profitable corporations was in the oil and gas field; in 2005 four of the ten were. They were Exxon-Mobil and Chevron Texaco (American) and Shell and BP (British). The Iraq war doubled the price of crude; it would go up another 50 percent during the first months of 2006."

FOR THE PROFITS

Profiting from the waging of war has been a common part of U.S. wars since at least the Civil War. During the 2003 War on Iraq Vice President Cheney directed massive no-bid contracts to a company, Halliburton, from which he was still receiving compensation, and profited from the same illegal war he defrauded the American public into launching. British Prime Minister Tony Blair was a little more circumspect in his war profiteering. The Stop the War Coalition kept up with him, however, writing in 2010:

"[Blair] earns £2 million a year for one day a month's work, from the US investment bank J P Morgan, who just happen to be making huge profits from financing 'reconstruction' projects in Iraq. There's no end of gratitude for Blair's services to the oil industry, the Iraq invasion so clearly being aimed at controlling the world's second largest oil reserves. The Kuwaiti Royal Family paid him around a million to produce a report on Kuwait's future, and business deals though a consultancy he has set up to advise other countries in the Middle East are projected to earn around £5 million a year. Just in case he runs short, he has signed up with the South Korean oil firm UI Energy Corporation, which has extensive interests in Iraq and which some estimates say will eventually net him £20 million."

FOR MONEY AND CLASS

Another economic motivation for war that is often overlooked is the advantage war presents for a privileged class of people who are concerned that those denied a fair share of the nation's wealth might rebel. In 1916 in the United States, socialism was gaining in popularity, while any sign of class struggle in Europe had been silenced by World War I. Senator James Wadsworth (R., N.Y.) proposed compulsory military training out of fear that "these people of ours shall be divided into classes." The poverty draft may serve a similar function today. The American Revolution may have as well. World War II put a stop to depression-era radicalism that saw the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) organizing black and white workers together.

World War II soldiers took their orders from Douglas MacArthur, Dwight Eisenhower, and George Patton, men who in 1932 had led the military's assault on the "Bonus Army," World War I veterans camped out in Washington, D.C., pleading to be paid the bonuses they'd been promised. This was a struggle that looked like a failure until World War II veterans were given the GI Bill of Rights.

McCarthyism led many struggling for the rights of working people to place militarism ahead of their own struggles for the latter half of the twentieth century. Barbara Ehrenreich wrote in 1997:

"Americans credited the Gulf War with 'bringing us together.' Serbian and Croatian leaders solved their people's post-communist economic discontents with an orgy of nationalist violence."

I was working for low-income community groups on September 11, 2001, and I recall how all talk of a better minimum wage or more affordable housing went away in Washington when the war trumpets sounded.

FOR OIL

A major motivation for wars is the seizing of control over other nations' resources. World War I made clear to war makers the importance of oil to fueling the wars themselves, as well as to fueling an industrial economy, and from that point forward a major motivation for war has been the conquest of nations that have supplies of oil. In 1940 the United States produced a majority (63 percent) of the world's oil, but in 1943 Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes said,

"If there should be a World War III it would have to be fought with someone else's petroleum, because the United States wouldn't have it."

President Jimmy Carter decreed in his last State of the Union address: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

Whether or not the first Gulf War was fought for oil, President George H. W. Bush said it was. He warned that Iraq would control too much of the world's oil if it invaded Saudi Arabia. The U.S. public denounced "blood for oil," and Bush quickly changed his tune. His son, attacking the same country a dozen years later, would allow his vice president to plan the war in secret meetings with oil executives, and would work hard to impose a "hydrocarbons law" on Iraq to benefit foreign oil companies, but he would not try to publicly sell the war as a mission to steal Iraqi oil. Or at least, that was not the primary focus of the sales pitch. There was a September 15, 2002, Washington Post headline that read "In Iraqi War Scenario, Oil Is Key Issue; U.S. Drillers Eye Huge Petroleum Pool."

Africom, the U.S. military's command structure for that seldom discussed chunk of land larger than all of North America, the African continent, was created by President George W. Bush in 2007. It had been envisioned a few years earlier, however, by the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (including representatives of the White House, Congress, and the oil corporations) as a structure "which could produce significant dividends in the protection of U.S. investments."169 According to General Charles Wald, deputy commander of U.S. forces in Europe,

"A key mission for U.S. forces [in Africa] would be to insure that Nigeria's oilfields, which in the future could account for as much as 25 percent of all U.S. oil imports, are secure."

I wonder what he means by "secure." Somehow I doubt his concern is to boost the oilfields' self-confidence.

U.S. involvement in Yugoslavia in the 1990s was not unrelated to lead, zinc, cadmium, gold, and silver mines, cheap labor, and a deregulated market. In 1996 U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown died in a plane crash in Croatia along with top executives for Boeing, Bechtel, AT&T, Northwest Airlines, and several other corporations that were lining up government contracts for "reconstruction."171 Enron, the famously corrupt corporation that would implode in 2001, was a part of so many such trips that it issued a press release to state that none of its people had been on this one. Enron gave $100,000 to the Democratic National Committee in 1997, six days before accompanying new Commerce Secretary Mickey Kantor to Bosnia and Croatia and signing a deal to build a $100 million power plant. The annexation of Kosovo, Sandy Davies writes in Blood on Our Hands,

"...did succeed in creating a small militarized buffer state between Yugoslavia and the projected route of the AMBO oil pipeline through Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania. This pipeline is being built, with U.S. government support, to provide the United States and Western Europe with access to oil from the Caspian Sea....Energy Secretary Bill Richardson explained the underlying strategy in 1998. 'This is about America's energy security,' he explained. '. . . It's very important to us that both the pipeline map and the politics come out right.'"

Longtime master of war Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke at a RAND Corporation forum on Afghanistan in a Senate caucus room in October 2009. His first statement was that "withdrawal from Afghanistan in the near future is a No-No." He offered no reasons why and suggested that his other statements would be more controversial.

During a subsequent question-and-answer period, I asked Brzezinski why such a statement should be considered uncontroversial when approximately half of Americans at that time opposed the occupation of Afghanistan. I asked how he would respond to the arguments of a U.S. diplomat who had just resigned in protest. Brzezinski responded that a lot of people are weak and don't know any better, and they should be ignored. Brzezinski said one of the main goals for the War on Afghanistan was to build a north-south gas pipeline to the Indian Ocean. This didn't noticeably shock anyone in the room.

In June 2010, a military-connected public relations firm persuaded the New York Times to run a front-page story proclaiming the discovery of vast mineral wealth in Afghanistan. Most of the claims were dubious, and those that were solid were not new. But the story had been planted at a time when senators and congress members were beginning to turn ever so slightly against the war. Apparently the White House or the Pentagon believed the possibility of stealing Afghans' lithium would generate more war support in Congress.

FOR EMPIRE

Fighting for territory, whatever rocks may lie beneath it, is a venerable motivation for war. Up through World War I and including it, empires battled each other for various territories and colonies. In the case of World War I there were Alsace-Lorraine, the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East. Wars are also fought to assert influence rather than ownership in regions of the globe. The U.S. bombing of Yugoslavia in the 1990s may have involved a desire to keep Europe subordinate to the United States through NATO, an organization that was in danger of losing its reason to exist.174 A war can also be fought for the purpose of weakening another nation without occupying it. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft said one purpose of the Gulf War was to leave Iraq with "no offensive capability." The United States' success in this regard came in handy when it attacked Iraq again in 2003.

The Economist was concerned to keep the War on Afghanistan going in 2007: "Defeat would be a body blow not only to the Afghans, but to the NATO alliance." The British Pakistani historian Tariq Ali commented: "As ever, geopolitics prevails over Afghan interests in the calculus of the big powers. The basing agreement signed by the U.S. with its appointee in Kabul in May 2005 gives the Pentagon the right to maintain a massive military presence in Afghanistan in perpetuity, potentially including nuclear missiles. That Washington is not seeking permanent bases in this fraught and inhospitable terrain simply for the sake of 'democratization and good governance' was made clear by NATO's Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Brookings Institution in February 2009: a permanent NATO presence in a country that borders the ex-Soviet republics, China, Iran, and Pakistan was too good to miss."

FOR THE GUNS

Another motivation for wars is the justification they provide for maintaining a large military and producing more weapons. This may have been a key motivation for various U.S. military actions following the Cold War. Talk of a peace dividend faded as wars and interventions proliferated. Wars also appear to be fought on occasion in a manner that allows the use of particular weapons even though the strategy makes no sense as a means to victory. In 1964, for example, U.S. war makers decided to bomb North Vietnam even though their intelligence told them the resistance in the South was home grown.

Why? Possibly because bombs were what they had to work with and — for whatever other reasons — they wanted war. As we've seen above, nuclear bombs were dropped unnecessarily on Japan, the second one even more unnecessarily than the first. That second one was a different type of bomb, a plutonium bomb, and the Pentagon wanted to see it tested. World War II in Europe had drawn to a close with a completely unnecessary U.S. bombing of the French town of Royan — again despite the French being our allies. This bombing was an early use of napalm on human beings, and the Pentagon apparently wanted to see what it would do.

MACHISMO

But men cannot live by bread alone. Wars fought against a global menace (communism, terrorism, or another) are also wars fought to display one's prowess to bystanders, thus preventing the toppling of dominoes — a danger that can always be precipitated by a loss of "credibility." Remarkably, in warmongerspeak "credibility" is a synonym for "bellicosity," not "honesty." Thus, nonviolent approaches to the world lack not only violence but also "credibility." There is something indecent about them. According to Richard Barnett,

"Military officers in the [Lyndon] Johnson Administration consistently argued the risks of defeat and humiliation were greater than the risks of mining Haiphong, obliterating Hanoi, or bombing 'selected targets' in China."

They knew the world would be outraged by such actions, but somehow there is nothing humiliating about the prospect of being ostracized as murderous madmen. Only softness can be humiliating.

One of the most dramatic news stories that came out of Daniel Ellsberg's release of the Pentagon Papers was the news that 70 percent of the motivation of the people behind the War on Vietnam was "to save face." It wasn't to keep the communists out of Peoria or to teach the Vietnamese democracy or anything so grand. It was to protect the image, or perhaps the self-image, of the war makers themselves. Assistant Secretary of "Defense" John McNaughton's March 24, 1965, memo said U.S. goals in horrifically bombing the people of Vietnam were 70 percent "to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as guarantor)," 20 percent to keep territory out of Chinese hands, and 10 percent to permit people a "better, freer way of life."

McNaughton was concerned that other nations, wondering whether or not the United States would have the toughness to bomb the hell out of them too, might ask questions like:

"Is the U.S. hobbled by restraints which might be relevant in future cases (fear of illegality, of U.N., of neutral reaction, of domestic pressures, of U.S. losses, of deploying U.S. ground forces in Asia, of war with China or Russia, of use of nuclear weapons, etc.)?"

That's a lot to prove you're not afraid of. But then we did drop a lot of bombs on Vietnam trying to prove it, over 7 million tons, as compared to the 2 million dropped in World War II. Ralph Stavins argues in Washington Plans an Aggressive War that John McNaughton and William Bundy understood that only withdrawal from Vietnam made sense, but backed escalation out of fear of seeming personally weak.

In 1975, after defeat in Vietnam, the masters of war were even touchier about their machismo than usual. When the Khmer Rouge seized a U.S.- registered merchant vessel, President Gerald Ford demanded the release of the ship and its crew. The Khmer Rouge complied. But U.S. jet fighters went ahead and bombed Cambodia as a means of showing that, as the White House put it, the United States "still stood ready to meet force with force to protect its interests."

Such displays of toughness are understood in Washington, D.C., to not only advance careers but also to enhance reputations in perpetuity. Presidents have long believed they could not be remembered as great presidents without wars. Theodore Roosevelt wrote to a friend in 1897, "In strict confidence...I should welcome almost any war, for I think this country needs one."

According to novelist and author Gore Vidal, President John Kennedy told him that a president needed a war for greatness and that without the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln would have been just another railroad lawyer. According to Mickey Herskowitz, who had worked with George W. Bush in 1999 on the latter's "autobiography," Bush wanted a war before becoming president. One disturbing thing about all this longing for war is that, while many of the motivations seem base, greedy, foolish, and despicable, some of them seem very personal and psychological. Perhaps it's "rational" to want world markets to buy U.S. products and to produce them more cheaply, but why must we have "supremacy in world markets?" Why do we collectively need "self-confidence?" Isn't that something each individual person finds on their own? Why the emphasis on "preeminence"? Why is there so little talk in the back rooms about being protected from foreign threats and so much about dominating foreigners with our superiority and fearsome "credibility"? Is war about being respected?

When you combine the illogic of these motivations for war with the fact that wars so often fail on their own terms and yet are repeated time and time again, it becomes possible to doubt that the masters of war are always masters of their own consciousness. The United States did not conquer Korea or Vietnam or Iraq or Afghanistan. Historically, empires have not lasted. In a rational world we would skip the wars and go straight to the peace negotiations that follow them. Yet, so often, we do not.

During the War on Vietnam, the United States apparently began the air war, began the ground war, and proceeded with each step of escalation because the war planners couldn't think of anything else to do other than ending the war, and despite their high confidence that what they were doing would not work. After a lengthy period during which these expectations were fulfilled, they did what they could have done from the start and ended the war.


David Swanson is the author of "War Is A Lie" from which this is excerpted: http://warisalie.org

http://davidswanson.org

http://warisacrime.org

RL of this article: www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=23443

O colapso da velha ordem do petróleo

Published on Thursday, March 3, 2011 by TomDispatch.com

Oilquake in the Middle East: The Collapse of the Old Oil Order

by Michael T. Klare

Whatever the outcome of the protests, uprisings, and rebellions now sweeping the Middle East, one thing is guaranteed: the world of oil will be permanently transformed. Consider everything that’s now happening as just the first tremor of an oilquake that will shake our world to its core.

For a century stretching back to the discovery of oil in southwestern Persia before World War I, Western powers have repeatedly intervened in the Middle East to ensure the survival of authoritarian governments devoted to producing petroleum. Without such interventions, the expansion of Western economies after World War II and the current affluence of industrialized societies would be inconceivable.

Here, however, is the news that should be on the front pages of newspapers everywhere: That old oil order is dying, and with its demise we will see the end of cheap and readily accessible petroleum -- forever.

Ending the Petroleum Age

Let’s try to take the measure of what exactly is at risk in the current tumult. As a start, there is almost no way to give full justice to the critical role played by Middle Eastern oil in the world’s energy equation. Although cheap coal fueled the original Industrial Revolution, powering railroads, steamships, and factories, cheap oil has made possible the automobile, the aviation industry, suburbia, mechanized agriculture, and an explosion of economic globalization. And while a handful of major oil-producing areas launched the Petroleum Age -- the United States, Mexico, Venezuela, Romania, the area around Baku (in what was then the Czarist Russian empire), and the Dutch East Indies -- it’s been the Middle East that has quenched the world’s thirst for oil since World War II.

In 2009, the most recent year for which such data is available, BP reported that suppliers in the Middle East and North Africa jointly produced 29 million barrels per day, or 36% of the world’s total oil supply -- and even this doesn’t begin to suggest the region’s importance to the petroleum economy. More than any other area, the Middle East has funneled its production into export markets to satisfy the energy cravings of oil-importing powers like the United States, China, Japan, and the European Union (EU). We’re talking 20 million barrels funneled into export markets every day. Compare that to Russia, the world’s top individual producer, at seven million barrels in exportable oil, the continent of Africa at six million, and South America at a mere one million.

As it happens, Middle Eastern producers will be even more important in the years to come because they possess an estimated two-thirds of remaining untapped petroleum reserves. According to recent projections by the U.S. Department of Energy, the Middle East and North Africa will jointly provide approximately 43% of the world’s crude petroleum supply by 2035 (up from 37% in 2007), and will produce an even greater share of the world’s exportable oil.

To put the matter baldly: The world economy requires an increasing supply of affordable petroleum. The Middle East alone can provide that supply. That’s why Western governments have long supported “stable” authoritarian regimes throughout the region, regularly supplying and training their security forces. Now, this stultifying, petrified order, whose greatest success was producing oil for the world economy, is disintegrating. Don’t count on any new order (or disorder) to deliver enough cheap oil to preserve the Petroleum Age.

To appreciate why this will be so, a little history lesson is in order.

The Iranian Coup

After the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) discovered oil in Iran (then known as Persia) in 1908, the British government sought to exercise imperial control over the Persian state. A chief architect of this drive was First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill. Having ordered the conversion of British warships from coal to oil before World War I and determined to put a significant source of oil under London’s control, Churchill orchestrated the nationalization of APOC in 1914. On the eve of World War II, then-Prime Minister Churchill oversaw the removal of Persia’s pro-German ruler, Shah Reza Pahlavi, and the ascendancy of his 21-year-old son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

Though prone to extolling his (mythical) ties to past Persian empires, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was a willing tool of the British. His subjects, however, proved ever less willing to tolerate subservience to imperial overlords in London. In 1951, democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq won parliamentary support for the nationalization of APOC, by then renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The move was wildly popular in Iran but caused panic in London. In 1953, to save this great prize, British leaders infamously conspired with President Dwight Eisenhower‘s administration in Washington and the CIA to engineer a coup d’état that deposed Mossadeq and brought Shah Pahlavi back from exile in Rome, a story recently told with great panache by Stephen Kinzer in All the Shah’s Men.

Until he was overthrown in 1979, the Shah exercised ruthless and dictatorial control over Iranian society, thanks in part to lavish U.S. military and police assistance. First he crushed the secular left, the allies of Mossadeq, and then the religious opposition, headed from exile by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Given their brutal exposure to police and prison gear supplied by the United States, the shah’s opponents came to loathe his monarchy and Washington in equal measure. In 1979, of course, the Iranian people took to the streets, the Shah was overthrown, and Ayatollah Khomeini came to power.

Much can be learned from these events that led to the current impasse in U.S.-Iranian relations. The key point to grasp, however, is that Iranian oil production never recovered from the revolution of 1979-1980.

Between 1973 and 1979, Iran had achieved an output of nearly six million barrels of oil per day, one of the highest in the world. After the revolution, AIOC (rechristened British Petroleum, or later simply BP) was nationalized for a second time, and Iranian managers again took over the company’s operations. To punish Iran’s new leaders, Washington imposed tough trade sanctions, hindering the state oil company’s efforts to obtain foreign technology and assistance. Iranian output plunged to two million barrels per day and, even three decades later, has made it back to only slightly more than four million barrels per day, even though the country possesses the world’s second largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia.

Dreams of the Invader

Iraq followed an eerily similar trajectory. Under Saddam Hussein, the state-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) produced up to 2.8 million barrels per day until 1991, when the First Gulf War with the United States and ensuing sanctions dropped output to half a million barrels daily. Though by 2001 production had again risen to almost 2.5 million barrels per day, it never reached earlier heights. As the Pentagon geared up for an invasion of Iraq in late 2002, however, Bush administration insiders and well-connected Iraqi expatriates spoke dreamily of a coming golden age in which foreign oil companies would be invited back into the country, the national oil company would be privatized, and production would reach never before seen levels.

Who can forget the effort the Bush administration and its officials in Baghdad put into making their dream come true? After all, the first American soldiers to reach the Iraqi capital secured the Oil Ministry building, even as they allowed Iraqi looters free rein in the rest of the city. L. Paul Bremer III, the proconsul later chosen by President Bush to oversee the establishment of a new Iraq, brought in a team of American oil executives to supervise the privatization of the country’s oil industry, while the U.S. Department of Energy confidently predicted in May 2003 that Iraqi production would rise to 3.4 million barrels per day in 2005, 4.1 million barrels by 2010, and 5.6 million by 2020.

None of this, of course, came to pass. For many ordinary Iraqis, the U.S. decision to immediately head for the Oil Ministry building was an instantaneous turning point that transformed possible support for the overthrow of a tyrant into anger and hostility. Bremer’s drive to privatize the state oil company similarly produced a fierce nationalist backlash among Iraqi oil engineers, who essentially scuttled the plan. Soon enough, a full-scale Sunni insurgency broke out. Oil output quickly fell, averaging only 2.0 million barrels daily between 2003 and 2009. By 2010, it had finally inched back up to the 2.5 million barrel mark -- a far cry from those dreamed of 4.1 million barrels.

One conclusion isn’t hard to draw: Efforts by outsiders to control the political order in the Middle East for the sake of higher oil output will inevitably generate countervailing pressures that result in diminished production. The United States and other powers watching the uprisings, rebellions, and protests blazing through the Middle East should be wary indeed: whatever their political or religious desires, local populations always turn out to harbor a fierce, passionate hostility to foreign domination and, in a crunch, will choose independence and the possibility of freedom over increased oil output.

The experiences of Iran and Iraq may not in the usual sense be comparable to those of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Oman, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. However, all of them (and other countries likely to get swept up into the tumult) exhibit some elements of the same authoritarian political mold and all are connected to the old oil order. Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Oman, and Sudan are oil producers; Egypt and Jordan guard vital oil pipelines and, in Egypt’s case, a crucial canal for the transport of oil; Bahrain and Yemen as well as Oman occupy strategic points along major oil sealanes. All have received substantial U.S. military aid and/or housed important U.S. military bases. And, in all of these countries, the chantis the same: “The people want the regime to fall.”

Two of these regimes have already fallen, three are tottering, and others are at risk. The impact on global oil prices has been swift and merciless: on February 24th, the delivery price for North Brent crude, an industry benchmark, nearly reached $115 per barrel, the highest it’s been since the global economic meltdown of October 2008. West Texas Intermediate, another benchmark crude, briefly and ominously crossed the $100 threshold.

Why the Saudis are Key

So far, the most important Middle Eastern producer of all, Saudi Arabia, has not exhibited obvious signs of vulnerability, or prices would have soared even higher. However, the royal house of neighboring Bahrain is already in deep trouble; tens of thousands of protesters -- more than 20% of its half million people -- have repeatedly taken to the streets, despite the threat of live fire, in a movement for the abolition of the autocratic government of King Hamad ibn Isa al-Khalifa, and its replacement with genuine democratic rule.

These developments are especially worrisome to the Saudi leadership as the drive for change in Bahrain is being directed by that country’s long-abused Shiite population against an entrenched Sunni ruling elite. Saudi Arabia also contains a large, though not -- as in Bahrain -- a majority Shiite population that has also suffered discrimination from Sunni rulers. There is anxiety in Riyadh that the explosion in Bahrain could spill into the adjacent oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia -- the one area of the kingdom where Shiites do form the majority -- producing a major challenge to the regime. Partly to forestall any youth rebellion, 87-year-old King Abdullah has just promised $10 billion in grants, part of a $36 billion package of changes, to help young Saudi citizens get married and obtain homes and apartments.

Even if rebellion doesn’t reach Saudi Arabia, the old Middle Eastern oil order cannot be reconstructed. The result is sure to be a long-term decline in the future availability of exportable petroleum.

Three-quarters of the 1.7 million barrels of oil Libya produces daily were quickly taken off the market as turmoil spread in that country. Much of it may remain off-line and out of the market for the indefinite future. Egypt and Tunisia can be expected to restore production, modest in both countries, to pre-rebellion levels soon, but are unlikely to embrace the sorts of major joint ventures with foreign firms that might boost production while diluting local control. Iraq, whose largest oil refinery was badly damaged by insurgents only last week, and Iran exhibit no signs of being able to boost production significantly in the years ahead.

The critical player is Saudi Arabia, which just increased production to compensate for Libyan losses on the global market. But don’t expect this pattern to hold forever. Assuming the royal family survives the current round of upheavals, it will undoubtedly have to divert more of its daily oil output to satisfy rising domestic consumption levels and fuel local petrochemical industries that could provide a fast-growing, restive population with better-paying jobs.

From 2005 to 2009, Saudis used about 2.3 million barrels daily, leaving about 8.3 million barrels for export. Only if Saudi Arabia continues to provide at least this much oil to international markets could the world even meet its anticipated low-end oil needs. This is not likely to occur. The Saudi royals have expressed reluctance to raise output much above 10 million barrels per day, fearing damage to their remaining fields and so a decline in future income for their many progeny. At the same time, rising domestic demand is expected to consume an ever-increasing share of Saudi Arabia’s net output. In April 2010, the chief executive officer of state-owned Saudi Aramco, Khalid al-Falih, predicted that domestic consumption could reach a staggering 8.3 million barrels per day by 2028, leaving only a few million barrels for export and ensuring that, if the world can’t switch to other energy sources, there will be petroleum starvation.

In other words, if one traces a reasonable trajectory from current developments in the Middle East, the handwriting is already on the wall. Since no other area is capable of replacing the Middle East as the world’s premier oil exporter, the oil economy will shrivel -- and with it, the global economy as a whole.

Consider the recent rise in the price of oil just a faint and early tremor heralding the oilquake to come. Oil won’t disappear from international markets, but in the coming decades it will never reach the volumes needed to satisfy projected world demand, which means that, sooner rather than later, scarcity will become the dominant market condition. Only the rapid development of alternative sources of energy and a dramatic reduction in oil consumption might spare the world the most severe economic repercussions.

© 2011 Michael T. Klare
Michael T. Klare is the Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts, and the author of Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependence on Imported Petroleum. A documentary version of that book is available at bloodandoilmovie.com. His newest book, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy, was recently published by Metropolitan Books.

Postado originalmente por Common Dreams.org, em 03/03/2011

quarta-feira, 2 de março de 2011

Por que esconder estatísticas de criminalidade?

Caso desloca a discussão principal, que é sobre o sigilo das informações

CLAUDIO BEATO
ESPECIAL PARA A FOLHA

Vivi nos EUA e na Inglaterra como professor visitante, e me impressionava a liberdade que havia para utilizar dados de criminalidade produzidos pelo poder público.
Na Universidade Harvard, recebíamos alertas da polícia sobre atividades criminosas nas ruas ao redor do campus.
Quem queria alugar casa podia consultar nos sites da polícia as ocorrências no local. Em Londres, avisos em hotspots de delitos na cidade e em pontos de metrô convidavam os usuários e transeuntes a serem cautelosos nesses locais. Por aqui, as coisas são muito diferentes.
A ideia de que alguém possa vender dados sigilosos desloca e oblitera a principal discussão, que reside no fato de que informações de segurança pública sejam secretas e ocultas ao público.
Ao personificar a notícia sobre um suposto malfeito, perdemos o foco do que deveria ser um debate central hoje. Por alguma estranha razão, prefere-se não divulgar dados sob o pretexto de que poderiam levar intranquilidade aos habitantes.
Naturalmente existem dados e informações que podem identificar e prejudicar pessoas e sobre os quais deve-se ter toda a precaução.
Mas informações relativas à distribuição de crimes certamente não se enquadram nessa categoria.
Há outra discussão ainda mais central. Não existe uma má política na área da segurança que não se inicie por uma péssima condição na organização dos dados. E não existe um caso de sucesso que não esteja calcado em boas informações e análises.
Túlio Kahn fazia excelente trabalho na organização dos dados na CAP, para fins de planejamento e análise das políticas públicas em SP.
Boas análises funcionam como holofotes sobre áreas problemáticas, iluminando também o trabalho dos responsáveis por elas. É como pescar em águas onde sabemos onde estarão os diferentes tipos de peixes, bem como os maus pescadores.
Quem lida com análises nessa área sabe dos inúmeros preconceitos e vieses vigentes, que terminam gerando situações como esta.
É um dos últimos redutos no qual sobrevive o que restou da antiga comunidade de informações, e do qual se nutrem gestores que não gostam de ver suas atividades avaliadas, muito menos submetidas a escrutínio público.
CLAUDIO BEATO é coordenador do Centro de Estudos em Criminalidade e Segurança Pública da UFMG
Artigo publicado no jornal Folha de S. Paulo, em 02/03/2011